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This paper revisits the currency crises model of Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjeee (2000,
2001, 2004), who show that if there exist nominal price rigidities and private sector credit
constraints, and the credit multiplier depends on real interest rates, then the optimal monetary
policy response to the threat of a currency crisis is restrictive. We demonstrate that this result
is primarily due to the uncovered interest parity assumption. Assuming that the exchange rate
is a martingale restores the case for expansionary reaction — even with foreign-currency debt
in ﬁrms’ balance sheets. The eﬀect of lower interest rates on output can help restore the value
of the currency due to increased money demand.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
From the viewpoint of economic policy, the central question when a currency crisis is imminent
is how should the monetary authorities respond? The monetary policy response followed in most
East-Asian countries aﬀected by the 1997-1998 crises, induced by unexpected currency shocks, was
to increase interest rates sharply.1 Despite intense criticism (see Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Krug-
man (1999)), the reaction was defensible. Domestic borrowers had issued large un-hedged foreign
currency liabilities, the domestic currency cost of which rose rapidly as the value of their currencies
fell. There was an urgent need to stop the capital outﬂows and reverse the large depreciations which
were leading to default and economic crises. It remains unclear how eﬀective this controversial pol-
icy response was. Its logic depends crucially on the eﬀectiveness of interest rate increases as a tool
to induce immediate appreciations in the exchange rate. But in all aﬀected countries the interest
rate defence was not eﬀective in appreciating the currency (at least in the short term — see Gould
and Kamin (2000)), and they all entered severe economic recessions (see Tirole (2002)).
Starting with Krugman (1999) and the sequence of pioneering papers by Aghion, Bacchetta and
Banerjee (2000, 2001, 2004), a growing group of researchers have developed a third-generation of
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1This was done by Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. The same stance was adopted
by Mexico in the 1994-1995 crises. (See Gould and Kamin (2000).)
1currency crises models. Motivated by the facts presented by the East-Asian crisis of 1997-1998,
these models depart from the previous generations of theoretic models (see Krugman (1979) and
Obstfeld (1994)) by placing the behaviour of the private sector at centre stage, and emphasising the
balance sheet eﬀects of foreign currency borrowing as a determinant of crises. The models provide
consistent frameworks with which to analyse the optimal monetary response to prevent or resolve
currency crises, and have, under certain assumptions, rationalised the high interest rate response
referred to above.
A common assumption in third-generation crises models is that uncovered interest parity (hence-
forth, UIP) holds.2 This assumption normally serves to ensure a link between current interest rates
and current exchange rates.3 It is naturally important in the subset of the literature which is
speciﬁcally concerned with the monetary policy response question.
This paper relaxes the UIP assumption within the monetary framework developed in the Aghion,
Bacchetta and Banerjee (henceforth, ABB) papers. (See in particular their 2001 paper.) The
principal (but not only) motivation for this simple extension is empirical. A slim body of recent
evidence gives support to UIP over long horizons and between currencies and long-term bonds
traded in deep and ﬂuid international ﬁnancial markets. Chinn and Meredith (2004) in particular,
show strong support for UIP when regressing the ten-year change in the exchange rate on a proxy
for the ten-year lagged diﬀerential in bond yields for a selection of high-income countries.4 But
when monetary tightening is advocated to prevent or solve crises, it is normally expected that the
exchange rate will stabilise or appreciate in response within a short period of time. If not, the beneﬁt
of preventing the deterioration of ﬁrms’ balance sheets due to depreciation will be not enjoyed —
output may have already fallen before the currency recovers. As discussed in Chinn (2006), the
overwhelming evidence on UIP as a short term relationship (not more than one year) continues to
ﬁrmly reject the hypothesis.5
Two other issues motivate this extension. The ﬁrst concerns the interest rate defence (i.e. the
recourse to tight monetary policy to prevent or reverse large currency depreciations): the evidence
on its eﬀectiveness, and its theoretic compatibility with UIP. In ABB(2000, 2001, and 2004), the
eﬀect of current domestic interest rates on the current exchange rate, representing the short-term
eﬀect, is a consequence of the interest parity assumption. (This is clear from the derivation of the
“interest parity-LM” equations.) However, some authors have argued that deviations from UIP are
a necessary condition for an interest rate defence to succeed. Flood and Rose (2002) note that if
UIP holds, and a monetary authority responds to heavy downward pressure on the currency by
raising interest rates, the increase in the latter will be exactly oﬀset by an increase in expected
2See Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001, 2004), Gertler, Gilchist, and Natalucci (2003), Cespedes, Chang
and Velasco (2004), and Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2005). An interesting exception is Christiano, Gust and Raldos
(2004). The conclusion we obtain in this simple monetary model regarding the interest rate response is consistent
with the latter.
3More precisely, let i represent the yield, at time t, on a domestic bond maturing at future date k;i∗ the yield,
at t,o naf o r e i g nb o n dw i t ht h es a m ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ;a n d∆ the expected depreciation of the domestic currency
(relative to that of the country where the foreign bond is issued) between times t and k. Assuming risk-neutrality,
the uncovered interest parity hypothesis states that the interest diﬀerential (i−i∗) is approximately equal to ∆,t h e
expected rate of depreciation over the term of the bonds.
4The proxies for lagged bond yields were obtained synthetically, by interpolating the yield curve.
5This is a well-known result. Other surveys include Froot and Thaler (1990) and Kilian and Taylor (2003). Flood
and Rose (2002) look at short horizon UIP using high frequency data during the main crises episodes of the 1990s
and indicate an improvement in the empirical performance of UIP. The basis for their claim is fragile: from the
sample of 21 countries, the slope coeﬃcient (in regressions of the interest diﬀerential on exchange rate depreciation,
which is equal to 1 if UIP holds) is negative in twelve cases, essentially zero in two cases, and positive in seven cases.
Of the seven positive coeﬃcients, three are statistically signiﬁcant. None of these three is meaningfully close to 1.
2depreciation, making domestic securities unattractive despite the higher yield.6 There is then an
inconsistency in assuming UIP and advocating interest rate rises to prevent or reverse depreciations
— as done for example in the ABB papers (applicable under ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rate regimes),
and much of the literature.
Conversely, the analysis in ABB can be interpreted as implying that UIP is a necessary condition
for interest rate increases to cause exchange rate appreciation. In such case, one would expect the
lack of empirical support for UIP to cause serious reservations about the eﬀectiveness of the interest
rate defence. Although there have been isolated cases where the interest rate defence was eﬀective in
countries with strong banking sectors,7 the existing systematic evidence shows that tight monetary
policy is generally ineﬀective in reversing large devaluations during currency crises. Speciﬁcally,
there seems to be no systematic association between interest rates (or other measures of monetary
policy) and the outcome of speculative currency attacks; and monetary policy responses with the
predicted sign on the exchange rate tend to be weak and statistically insigniﬁcant.8 Short-term
UIP is an empirical failure; and so it seems is the interest rate defence.
The last motivation is the recent increase in foreign currency borrowing observed in lower in-
come developing countries — which tend to have a heavy dependence on volatile commodity prices
and to be exposed to frequent currency shocks.9 It is common for no distinction to be made be-
tween “emerging markets” and lower income developing countries, typically with little exposure to
international capital markets.10 In the currency crises literature it is normally implicit from either
the assumptions or the context that motivates the study, that the analysis is applicable to emerging
markets only. This focus may be necessary in ﬁrst- and second-generation crises models, where
6Observe that the argument in Flood and Rose (2002) requires that: a) the exchange rate is currently ﬁxed; b)
the current peg is not expected to last; and c) the belief that the peg will collapse does not cause an immediate
devaluation. It does not apply under ﬂexible exchange rates, nor if the second requirement invalidates the third.
Suppose that following an increase in domestic interest rates the exchange rate appreciates, say due to a reversion in
the proﬁtability of the carry trade, but expected future exchange rates remain unchanged. The interest rate defence
would have succeeded. But the expected rate of depreciation has increased, which is consistent with UIP.
7Probably the most vivid case was the Swedish Central Bank’s temporary success in repelling heavy krona selling
by raising its daily lending rate to 500 percent, during the collapse of the European Monetary System in 1992. (See
Bensaid and Jeanne (1997).)
8For the empirical evidence see Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Gould and Kamin (2000), and Kraay (2003). A
number of studies have attempted to explain precisely why interest rate defences may fail. Bensaid and Jeanne
(1997) develop a theoretic model where the anticipation that the authorities will try to protect the value of the
currency by raising interest rates can lead to self-fulﬁlling currency crisis. See also the discussions in Furman and
Stiglitz (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (1998). Corsetti, Presenti and Roubini (2001) discuss evidence of “double
play” strategies where investors take short positions in the target currency and bond markets, so an interest rate
defense permits the speculator to gain from either (or both) the currency depreciation or a fall in bond prices brought
about by the interest rate rise. In such cases the possibility of an interest rate defense may stimulate further the
incentive for large traders to sell the currency.
9See Nicoló, Honohan and Ize (2003) for data on foreign currency liabilities in developing country banking sectors.
Of course, if banks also lend in foreign currency they are not directly exposed to currency shocks. But the currency
exposure simply moves to borrower balance sheets, so currency shocks aﬀect non-bank balance sheets directly, and
banks’ loan portfolios indirectly (through increased default rates). Consider Mozambique as a speciﬁce x a m p l e .
According to an IMF Country Report (04/52 of March 2004), foreign exchange liabilities reached 63% of total
liabilities in the banking sector by 2001. But a similar ratio of bank loans was denominated in foreign currency
and statistics from the Mozambican central bank show that foreign currency debt reached 60% of total debt for the
non-bank sector in 2004 — with the latter group of borrowers rarely hedging their foreign currency debt.
10To be more speciﬁc consider the distinction adopted by Husain, Mody and Rogoﬀ (2005). Take the set of countries
which are not classiﬁed as upper income countries by the World Bank. Of these, the Emerging Market countries are
those classiﬁed as such by the Morgan Stanley Capital International classiﬁcation according to a number of factors
related to international capital market access. The remaining countries are what we refer to in this note as “less
developed countries”.
3movements in international portfolio capital ﬂows play a central role.
In third-generation models however, the combination of a large depreciation with credit con-
straints and domestic borrowing in foreign-currency, is suﬃcient to cause a currency crises. Portfolio
capital outﬂows can either cause or aggravate depreciations. But the latter can just as well be caused
by shocks to a country’s terms of trade or sudden reductions in foreign aid. And although a the-
oretic case for uncovered interest parity remains valid for advanced economies and some emerging
markets with globally integrated capital markets, this is not the case for LDCs. In these countries
interest parity has neither empirical nor theoretic support. Due to their rudimentary ﬁnancial
markets and isolation from international portfolio investment ﬂows, the arbitrage-based theoretic
motivation for interest parity conditions is inapplicable.11 The focus on credit market imperfections
in contributions such as Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) however, is certainly relevant.
2 Present paper’s contribution
A key result in ABB(2001) is that, if some proportion of ﬁrms’ liabilities is denominated in foreign
currency (so that crises are possible), and the credit multiplier depends only on the real interest
rate, then prevention or resolution of crises requires tight monetary policy (lower money supply or
higher interest rates). We demonstrate that this result is primarily due, not to the dependence of the
credit multiplier on real interest rates, but to the uncovered interest parity assumption. Relaxing the
latter restores the case for monetary relaxation to prevent or resolve currency crises — consistent
with conventional wisdom and the result in ABB(2000) where the same policy implication is a
consequence of assuming the credit multiplier depends (only) on nominal interest rates. Moreover,
it is shown that an expansionary monetary response need not lead to further depreciations, and
may in fact contribute to currency appreciation.
The analysis illustrates how monetary tightening in response to a contractionary currency de-
preciation may prolong or accentuate a crisis through two channels: ﬁrst it reduces the availability
of external ﬁnancing and increases the cost of domestic currency debt (without reducing the domes-
tic currency cost of foreign currency debt), unambiguously weakening corporate balance sheets and
reducing output; second, the anticipation of the consequent economic recession can lead to further
exchange rate depreciation through the expected eﬀect of lower output on demand for domestic
currency. Conversely, reducing interest rates increases the availability of external funds and low-
ers the cost of debt denominated in domestic currency without inducing further depreciation (and
therefore not increasing the cost of foreign currency liabilities). If its eﬀect on output is suﬃciently
strong to raise output despite a currency shock, lower interest rates can also exert upward pressure
on the value of the currency, through standard money market equilibrium eﬀects, thus helping to
defend the value of the currency.
Our results are obtained through a simple extension of the analysis developed in Aghion, Bac-
chetta and Banerjee (2001).12 Speciﬁcally, we focus on the monetary policy implications of replacing
uncovered interest parity with a martingale process for the exchange-rate. The martingale assump-
tion is consistent with the classical empirical demonstration by Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) showing
that the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of a simple martingale (predicting the exchange rate to
remain unchanged) is generally greater than that of a variety of standard exchange-rate determi-
11See for example Aron and Ayogu (1997).
12This monetary model was introduced in simpler form in Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000).
4nation models.13 Theoretically, the assumption can be justiﬁed by recent research (see Engel and
West (2005)) showing that, provided the discount factor (used to discount future fundamentals in a
rational expectations present value model) is close to one, the exchange rate will follow a process ar-
bitrarily close to a random walk if at least one of its fundamental determinants (which may include
unobservable fundamentals) has a unit root.14 Assuming that the exchange rate process satisﬁes
the martingale property does not therefore imply the absence of equilibrating forces pushing the
exchange-rate towards an equilibrium fundamental value. Merely that at least one of these forces
is I(1) — a very plausible assumption.
The parsimonious setup in ABB (2001) is appealing for the purpose of this study for a number of
reasons. Despite its simplicity the model is basedo nf a c t sw h i c ha r ek n o w nt oh a v ec o n t r i b u t e dt o
recent crises. First, it is consistent with the high level of foreign-currency borrowing in the private
sector of countries aﬀected by the Asian crisis in 1997-1998. Second, it reﬂects the substantial de-
viations from purchasing power parity commonly observed after the occurrence of currency shocks.
Third, it captures the relationship between decline in output during crises and ﬁnancial sector
under-development, in the form of credit market imperfections. Fourth, although we concentrate
here on the case of ﬂexible exchange rates, the framework is applicable under ﬂexible and ﬁxed
exchange rate regimes. Fifth, it predicts the occurrence of crises despite sound ﬁscal management
and macroeconomic stability. And lastly, the clearly laid-out monetary side is, by design, partic-
ularly well-suited for the analysis of monetary policy during crises. Given our speciﬁci n t e r e s ti n
this issue, the ABB (2001) setup lends itself easily to analytic clarity, without imposing the need
for any more assumptions than what is necessary to reﬂect the essential stylised facts.
Other studies that analyse monetary policy in crises include Krugman (1999) and Cespedes,
Chang and Velasco (2004), who require speciﬁc assumptions on the role of tradable and non-
tradables, and Gertler, Gilchist, and Natalucci (2003), who focus on the choice of the exchange rate
regime in considering the optimal response to crises. Christiano, Gust and Raldos (2004) argue, in
contrast to ABB (2001) and in a diﬀerent setup which does not assume uncovered interest parity,
that allowing further depreciation may be an appropriate response to crises.
The next section presents the essential features of the ABB model without assuming interest
parity. This is followed by the introduction of the alternative martingale assumption and the simple
derivation of an associated LM curve. An analysis of the monetary response to a currency shock
under diﬀerent speciﬁcations for the credit multiplier follows, and the paper is concluded.
3 Aghion-Bacchetta-Banerjee setup without interest parity
3.1 The setup
Consider a simple inﬁnite-horizon small open economy monetary model with the common features
in ABB (2000) and ABB (2001), except that uncovered interest parity does not hold.15 Following
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995), prices are assumed preset for one period. Purchasing power parity
holds ex-ante, so pt+1 = Et (st+1) at any t,w h e r ept+1 is the domestic price for period t +1 ,
13For subsequent evidence documenting the persistence of this result see for example Froot and Thaler (1990),
Taylor (1995), and Kilian and Taylor (2003).
14The assumption is also consistent with the result in Manuelli and Peck (1990), who show precisely that under
certain conditions the martingale property is the only restriction that equilibrium exchange rates have to satisfy.
15For micro-foundations see Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004).
5pre-set at t,a n dEt (st+1) denotes the expectation at t, of the spot exchange rate (units of domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency) at t +1 . The foreign price is constant and equal to one.
The monetary setting is standard. Consumers have a real money demand function given by md
t =
md (yt,i t), where it is assumed that md is increasing in yt and decreasing in it ,a n dmd (0,i t) > 0.
Let ms
t denote nominal money supply at t. Then money market equilibrium, at time t, is described




= md (yt,i t) (1)
Under these conditions it is evident that there is an unambiguously negative contemporaneous
relationship between money supply and the rate of interest. This obviates the need to distinguish
between money supply and the rate of interest as the monetary policy instrument.
The representation of credit market imperfections follows Bernanke and Gertler (1989) in assum-
ing that an entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity is a function of its internal funds (the accumulation of
retained earnings). In speciﬁc, letting wt represent current real wealth, the total amount (identical)
entrepreneurs are able to borrow, dt , is limited to a multiple of wealth, i.e. dt ≤ μtwt.16
Output, yt, is produced using (working) capital, kt, according to a concave production function
yt = f (kt). Working capital depreciates within one period so at the beginning of each period we
have kt = wt + dt , implying that whenever the credit constraint is binding we have
yt = f ((1 + μt)wt) (2)
For period t, entrepreneurs can borrow in domestic currency at interest rate it−1 or in foreign
currency at the constant foreign rate of interest i∗. Interest rates are set one period ahead. At the
end of period t, nominal operating proﬁts net of ﬁnancing costs are given by
πt = ptyt − (1 + it−1)pt−1dc
t − (1 + i∗)
st
st−1
pt−1 (dt − dc
t) (3)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of this equation represents operating proﬁts; the second
is the cost of domestic currency debt (where dc
t is the stock of domestic currency debt); and the
third term represents the cost of foreign currency debt, determined by the foreign interest rate and
the loss in value of domestic currency relative to that in which the foreign currency loan is issued,
expressed in domestic currency units.
Let α denote the fraction of proﬁts distributed as dividends. Assuming positive proﬁts, the
remaining share of (1 − α) is retained and used to ﬁnance future investment (directly, and by
determining the amount of external funds which can be borrowed), giving total net real wealth
available for ﬁnancing production in any period after start-up as




from which it follows (by substituting equation (3) into (4), and the result into equation (2)):
yt= f

(1 + μt)(1− α)















16We will concentrate on the case where the constraint is binding, i.e.dt = μtwt . The credit multiplier is speciﬁed
in section 4. Until then it will be treated as a constant.
6This real-sector equation (the “W” curve) is particularly instructive as a description of the
output response of credit-constrained entrepreneurs, in period t +1 , to changes in the exchange
rate in period t. Equilibrium requires that equation (5) as well as the condition for money market
equilibrium be met. (See remark below and section 3.)
The timing of events is as follows. Start in period 1. First the price level is set for one period,
and ﬁrms invest. An unanticipated (once-oﬀ) shock then occurs. The monetary authorities respond
to this shock using the money supply or (equivalently) the interest rate. The monetary response
determines the cost of domestic currency debt maturing at the end of the second period, but has no
eﬀe c to np e r i o d1p r o ﬁts. The change in the period 1 exchange rate due to the unanticipated shock
does however aﬀect proﬁts realized in period 1. These, in turn, determine the amount available for
investment in period 2, and hence, period 2 output.
3.2 Remarks
In ABB (2000, 2001, 2004), interest parity (IP) combined with the standard LM relationship leads
to an “IPLM” equation, relating the current exchange rate to current interest rates and next-
period output and interest rates. Short-run equilibrium is then deﬁned, for a given path of prices
and interest rates, by the values of st and yt+1 that satisfy both the IPLM and W equations —
essentially a standard textbook intersection of the IPLM and W curves, in (yt+1,s t) space.17 In
the absence of interest parity we do not have an IPLM curve. We will derive, in section 4, an
alternative relationship between the exchange rate and next period interest rates and output. The
short-run equilibrium of the model is deﬁned analogously. The economy is understood to be in a
currency crisis state when the values of stand yt+1 that simultaneously satisfy both the W and LM
equations consist of the combination of a high (depreciated) exchange rate with output arbitrarily
close to zero.
Observe that the third term in the right-hand side of equation (3) represents the cost of foreign-
currency debt in terms of domestic-currency irrespective of whether UIP holds. This simple fact
drives the negative relationship between output and the exchange rate in the previous period in
equation (5). It captures the balance-sheet eﬀect of currency depreciations.
4 Occurrence of crisis and monetary policy in the no interest
parity case
4.1 The LM equation
Assume the only restriction imposed on equilibrium exchange rate determination is that the ex-
change rate process is a martingale.18 Thus, at any t and for any j ≥ 1 we have Etst+j = st.I n
words, the expectation at time t of the exchange-rate at a future date, conditional on information
available up to t, is simply the time-t exchange-rate.
17See ABB(2000, 2001) for simple graphical illustrations.
18More precisely: Consider a probability space (Ω, F, P), where Ω denotes the sample space (the set of possible
exchange rate paths); Ft the σ-algebra generated by (s1,s 2,...,s t), representing the ﬂow of information generated
by the exchange rate history and events up to time t;a n dP is a probability measure on (Ω,F) — to be understood as
an objective probability distribution, with respect to which all expectations in this paper are taken. We are assuming
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ep r o c e s si sa nFt-martingale with respect to P, and the expectations operator Et in Etst+j above
really means EP(•|Ft)
7Now, from ex-ante purchasing power parity (and not depending on the absence of a shock in pe-











This equation describes an LM curve consistent with a martingale process for the exchange rate,
when purchasing power parity holds ex-ante. In the current setup, equation (6) replaces the IPLM
equation in ABB (2000, 2001, 2004), with which it coincides only if domestic and foreign interest
rates are equal. It shows how changes in the exchange rate aﬀect money market equilibrium in the
following period. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as showing how expected monetary conditions
in period 2 aﬀect the period-1 exchange rate. The reasoning is as follows. Consider an anticipated
increase in output over period 2. This causes increased demand for money for that period. Money
market equilibrium would then require a reduction in period-2 prices. But these are set in period 1,
according to the period-1 expectation of the period-2 exchange rate. This expectation is equal to the
actual exchange rate in period 1. Thus the period-1 exchange rate has to decrease. Intuitively, the
anticipation of increased demand for domestic currency causes the latter to appreciate immediately.
4.2 Occurrence of currency crises
Suppose the economy is hit by an unexpected shock leading to currency depreciation in period 1.19
Using equation (5), the eﬀect on period-2 output can be read from the equation below:
y2 = f
µ
(1 + μ2)(1− α)
∙











Treat the credit multiplier as a constant. Then, since all period-1 variables in the right-hand
side of this equation, other than the exchange and interest rates, are ﬁxed at the beginning of the
period, the increase in s1has an unambiguously negative eﬀect on y2.T h i si sr e ﬂected by the ratio
of s1 to p1 inside the square brackets in equation (7). The economic story is simple. Currency
depreciation raises the cost of servicing foreign-currency liabilities contracted in period-1. Since
p1 is ﬁxed at the beginning of the period (so the depreciation causes an ex-post deviation from
purchasing power parity), the increase in the domestic-currency cost of foreign-currency liabilities
is not hedged by an increase in revenues. This reduces period-1 proﬁt sw h i c hi nt u r nr e d u c e st h e
capacity to borrow and invest in the second period. Hence there is a reduction in period-2 output.
We refer to this outcome as a currency crisis if it occurs at point where the value of y2 is arbitrarily
close to zero — in practical terms the combination of a “very high” depreciated exchange rate with
“very low” output. How should the monetary authorities react?
4.3 The case for expansionary monetary policy
To evaluate the eﬀe c t so fm o n e t a r yp o l i c yo no u t p u tw eh a v et ob es p e c i ﬁc about the credit multi-
plier. In ABB(2000) the multiplier is assumed to depend only on the nominal interest rate. In ABB
(2001), it depends uniquely on the real interest rate, which stands in one to one correspondence to
the real exchange rate. ABB (2001) observe that either extreme might be inappropriate, as there
19Examples include productivity and terms of trade shocks, causing the W curve to shift down.
8are reasons to expect both real and nominal interest rates to aﬀect credit supply. They obtain
sharply diﬀerent policy implications from merely varying this assumption: restrictive monetary
policy is the optimal response to the threat of a currency crisis when the credit multiplier depends
on the real interest rate, but not when the multiplier depends (only) on the nominal rate. This is
seen below not to be the case in the present paper, where: ﬁrst, the multiplier’s dependence on the
real interest rate is consistent with dependence also on the nominal rate; and second, changing the
setting so that the credit multiplier depends only on the nominal interest rate does not reverse the
monetary policy implications.
Since from the analytic viewpoint this paper diﬀers from ABB (2001) only in replacing interest
parity by a martingale for the exchange rate, it follows that the sensitivity of the model to the
distinction between nominal and real interest rates as credit supply determinants is due to the
interest parity assumption. This argument is now made more precise.
4.3.1 Case 1: the credit multiplier depends on real (and nominal) interest rates
Following ABB (2001) let credit depend negatively on the real interest rate, so μt = μ(rt−1)
with μ
0
< 0,a n dd e ﬁne the real interest rate by 1+rt =( 1 + it)pt/pt+1. Since purchasing-
power parity holds ex-ante we have p2 = E1s2 ,i m p l y i n g( f r o mt h ed e ﬁnition of the real interest
rate) that 1+r1 =( 1+i1)p1/E1s2.S i n c e E1s2 = s1 (from the martingale assumption) we have
1+r1 =( 1+i1)p1/s1. Hence the credit multiplier can be re-written as μt = μ(it−1,s t−1/pt−1),
where μ is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i, and increasing in the nominal exchange-rate
to price ratio s/p, here the real exchange rate.20 The equation for period-2 output becomes:
y2 = f
µ
[1 + μ(i1,s 1/p1)](1 − α)
∙











Now an increase in the exchange rate has two eﬀects on output. It raises the cost of foreign-
currency debt (the balance sheet eﬀect), with a negative impact on output — as can be seen from
the second square brackets in (8); but it also increases the ratio of the exchange-rate to price, which
relaxes the credit constraint (an increase in μ2 ) and impacts positively on y2 ,r e ﬂecting increased
availability of external funds for period-2. (This can be loosely interpreted as a competitiveness
eﬀect in the sense that there is an increase in output following the currency depreciation for a
given level of foreign currency debt.) In the absence of some form of policy response, the eﬀect of
the shock becomes ambiguous. There is a (negative) foreign-currency debt eﬀect, and a (positive)
credit market eﬀect.
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r et h ee ﬀect on the cost of foreign currency debt dominates, so that in
the absence of some form of policy intervention the economy will experience a contraction due to
the currency shock. Suppose that the monetary authorities react to the shock by tightening money
supply or (equivalently) raising the interest rate. From the expression for the credit multiplier one
sees that an increase in i1 leads to a reduction in μ2, causing y2 to fall further. Because the interest
rate increase is ineﬀective in appreciating or restoring the initial value of the currency, it does not
prevent the increase in the cost of foreign-currency debt. Yet, it tightens the credit constraint,
with the unambiguous consequence of exacerbating the reduction in output caused by the currency
shock.
20In ABB (2001) the real interest rate is uniquely determined by the s/p ratio. Real and nominal interest rates
are disconnected.
9In addition, the contraction in period-2 output (originally caused by the unanticipated shock but
ampliﬁed by the tight monetary policy reaction) reduces period-2 money demand. From the LM
equation (6), and holding period-2 money supply (or its expectation) unchanged, the anticipation of
lower period-2 money demand leads to an increase in the exchange-rate in period-1. As suggested by
Furman and Stiglitz (1998), monetary tightening can increase the upward pressure on the exchange
rate, pushing the economy further to the currency crisis situation.
In contrast, consider an expansionary monetary response. Reducing interest rates in period-1
lowers the period-2 cost of domestic-currency debt without increasing the cost of foreign-currency
denominated debt (since it does not provoke further currency depreciation). Since μ is decreasing
in the nominal interest rate, lower interest rates lead to an expansion in external debt funding in
period-2. This stimulates investment capacity and (from the ﬁrst square brackets in equation (8))
period-2 output — at least partly compensating for the negative eﬀect of the unexpected depreciation
on proﬁtability. In the extreme scenario where the credit channel boost to output exceeds the
contractionary balance-sheet eﬀect of the depreciation (net of the positive eﬀect of depreciation
on the credit multiplier), period-2 output will increase. From LM equation (6), the stimulus to
output raises period-2 demand for money, the expectation of which exerts downward pressure on
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ei np e r i o d - 1 . 21 Thus, reducing interest rates can (at least partly) restore the value
of the currency and prevent a crisis.
4.3.2 Case 2: credit multiplier depends only on nominal interest rates
Lastly, we also examine the simple case in ABB(2000) where the credit multiplier depends only on
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which diﬀers from equation (8) only in the speciﬁcation of the credit multiplier as μ2 = μ(i1). An
unexpected increase in the exchange rate s1 now has no eﬀect on the supply of credit. Its eﬀect
on output, through an increase in the cost of foreign currency debt, is unambiguously negative.
Consider an increase in interest rates i1 as the monetary response. From μ
0
< 0 this leads to a
reduction in external funding for period 2. Since the increase in interest rates does not appreciate
the currency, the reduction in μ(i1) ampliﬁes the negative eﬀect of the currency shock on period-2
output. Moreover, the decline in period-2 output causes a decrease in period-2 demand for money,
the anticipation of which exerts further upward pressure on the period-1 exchange rate. This follows
from the LM equation (6), and presumes that no increases are expected in period-2 money supply.
In contrast, responding by reducing i1 may prevent the decline in period-2 output. The channels
are the same. The lower interest rate expands the availability of credit in period-2, which has a
positive eﬀect on output. If this eﬀect is larger than the negative eﬀect of the currency depreci-
ation, period-2 output may increase. Such an increase would raise period-2 money demand, the
anticipation of which puts upward pressure on the value of the currency in period-1, at least partly
21By reducing the cost of borrowing in domestic currency without inducing further depreciation, lower interest
rates could in practice also reduce the cost of reﬁnancing foreign-currency liabilities with domestic currency loans.
This would prevent or at least reduce defaults on foreign-currency debt, and therefore alleviate the contraction in
credit following a large depreciation. In cases where private sector foreign currency borrowing is coupled by large
domestic currency public debt, the contractionary consequences of raising interest rates would be magniﬁed.
10reversing the eﬀect of the unanticipated depreciation. As in case 1, the appropriate or least harmful
monetary policy response is expansionary, if aimed at preventing a reduction in output.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper adds to the insights on the monetary policy response to prevent or resolve currency
crises caused by balance sheet eﬀects, presented in the sequence of papers by Aghion, Bacchetta and
Banerjee (2000, 2001, 2004). Put together, these insights can be summarised as follows. Consider
an economy characterised by private sector credit constraints and the existence of nominal price
rigidities. Then restrictive monetary policy is the optimal response to the threat of a currency crisis
if uncovered interest parity holds and the credit multiplier depends only on real interest rates — the
case in ABB(2001). In contrast, lower interest rates (or money supply expansion) is the appropriate
response if: a) interest parity holds and the credit multiplier depends only on nominal interest rates
— the ABB(2000) case; or, b) the exchange rate is a martingale and the credit multiplier can depend
on real or nominal interest rates, or both — the case presented in this paper.
References
[1] Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bacchetta and Abhijit Banerjee. 2000. “A Simple Model of Mone-
tary Policy and Currency Crises.” European Economic Review, 44(4): 728-738.
[2] Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bacchetta and Abhijit Banerjee. 2001. “Currency Crises and Mon-
etary Policy in an Economy with Credit Constraints.” European Economic Review, 45(7):
1121-1150.
[3] Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bacchetta and Abhijit Banerjee. 2004. “A Corporate Balance-Sheet
Approach to Currency Crises.” Journal of Economic Theory, 119(1): 6-30.
[4] Aron, Janine and Melvin Ayogu. 1997. “Foreign Exchange Market Eﬃciency Tests in Sub-
Saharan Africa.” Journal of African Economies (AERC Supplement), 6(3): 150-192.
[5] Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler. 1989. “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctua-
tions.” American Economic Review, 79(1): 14-31.
[6] Bensaid, Bernard and Olivier Jeanne. 1997. “The Instability of Fixed Exchange Rate Systems
When Raising the Nominal Interest Rate is Costly.” European Economic Review, 41(8): 1461-
1478.
[7] Céspedes, Luis, Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco. 2004. “Balance Sheets and Exchange Rate
Policy.” American Economic Review, 94(4): 1183-1193.
[8] Chinn, Menzie. 2006. “The (Partial) Rehabilitation of Interest Rate Parity in the Floating Area:
Longer Horizons, Alternative Expectations, and Emerging Markets.” Journal of International
Money and Finance, 25(1): 7-21
[9] Chinn, Menzie and Guy Meredith. 2004. “Monetary Policy and Long-Horizon Uncovered In-
terest Parity.” IMF Staﬀ Papers, 51(3): 409-430.
11[10] Christiano, Lawrence, Christopher Gust and Jorge Raldos. 2004. “Monetary Policy in a Fi-
nancial Crisis.” Journal of Economic Theory, 119(1): 64-103.
[11] Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paulo Presenti and Nouriel Roubini. 2001. “The Role of Large Players in
Currency Crises,” in Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets. Sebastian, E., and J.
Frankel, eds. NBER and Chicago University Press.
[12] Devereux, Michael, Philip Lane, and Juanyi Xu. 2005. “Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy
in Emerging Market Economies.” Forthcoming in Economic Journal.
[13] Engel, Charles and Kenneth West. 2005. “Exchange Rates and Fundamentals.” Journal of
Political Economy, 113(3): 485-517.
[14] Flood, Robert and Andrew Rose. 2002. “Uncovered Interest Parity in Crisis.” IMF Staﬀ Papers,
49(2): 252-266.
[15] Froot, Kenneth and Richard Thaler. 1990. “Foreign Exchange.” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 4(3): 179-92.
[16] Furman, Jason and Joseph Stiglitz. 1998. “Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East
Asia.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 1-114.
[17] Gertler, Mark, Simon Gilchist, and Fabio Natalucci. 2003. “External Constraints on Monetary
Policy and the Financial Accelerator.” NBER Working Paper 10128.
[18] Gould, David and Steven Kamin. 2000. “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates
During Financial Crises.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International
Finance Discussion Paper No 669.
[19] Husain, Aasim, Ashoka Mody and Kenneth Rogoﬀ. 2005. “Exchange Rate Regime Durability
and Performance in Developing versus Advanced Economies.” Journal of Monetary Economics,
52(1): 35-64.
[20] Kilian, Lutz and Mark Taylor. 2003. “Why is it So Diﬃcult to Beat the Random Walk Forecast
of Exchange Rates?” Journal of International Economics, 60(1): 85-107.
[21] Kraay, Aart. 2003. “Do High Interest Rates Defend Currencies During Speculative Attacks?”
Journal of International Economics, 59(2): 297-321.
[22] Krugman, Paul. 1979. “A Model of Balance of Payments Crises.” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 11(3): 311-325.
[23] Krugman, Paul. 1999. “Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises,” in Inter-
national Finance and Financial Crises - Essays in Honor of Robert Flood. Isard, P., and A.
R o s e ,e d s .D o r d r e c h t :K l u w e r .
[24] Manuelli, Rodolfo and James Peck. 1990. “Exchange Rate Volatility in an Equilibrium Asset
Pricing Model.” International Economic Review, 31(3): 559-574.
[25] Meese, Richard and Kenneth Rogoﬀ. 1983. “Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies:
Do They Fit Out of Sample?” Journal of International Economics, 14(1): 3-24.
12[26] Obstfeld, Maurice. 1994. “The Logic of Currency Crises.” Banque de France, Cashiers
Économiques et Monétaires, 43: 189-213.
[27] Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoﬀ. 1995. “Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux.” Journal of
Political Economy, 103(3): 624-660.
[28] Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoﬀ. 1996. Foundations of International Macroeconomics.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[29] Nicoló, Gianni, Patrick Honohan and Alain Ize. 2003. “Dollarization of the Banking System:
Good or Bad?.” International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 03-146.
[30] Radelet, Steven and Jeﬀrey Sachs. 1998. “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Reme-
dies, Prospects.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1-90.
[31] Taylor, Mark. 1995. “The Economics of Exchange Rates.” Journal of Economic Literature,
33(1): 13-47.
[32] Tirole, Jean. 2002. Financial Crises, Liquidity and the International Monetary System. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
13